Observers of the war in Ukraine woke on Saturday morning to the news of an armed mutiny by the Wagner PMC. Rostov-on-Don had been seized and the military HQ of the Russian Southern Command captured without a shot being fired. Prigozhin, filmed inside the HQ speaking to Russia’s deputy Defence Minister and deputy Chief of the General Staff surrounded by armed Wagnerites, demanded talks with Shoigu and Gerasimov. When that was denied to Prigozhin, he began his “march for justice” towards Moscow, taking Voronezh and allegedly shooting down up to seven aircraft along the way
The news was well received in Ukraine and beyond. The irony of “Kyiv in three days” but Rostov in three hours was lost on no-one. While Wagner has been an enemy to Ukraine in Bakhmut and beyond, it was hard for many not to feel a little glee as they moved towards Moscow. For a whole excited day, most people were checking their phones for news of their progress.
And then, just as the heavens opened here last night in Dnipro, it was all over. Prigozhin had struck a deal through Belorussian president Lukashenko to accept exile in Belarus and call off the mutiny. It’s still unclear what the exact terms of the agreement were, nor why Prigozhin climbed down so quickly, but it seems likely he had been counting on more support amongst Russia’s armed forces and the Moscow political elite, which did not precipitate in the event. So much for “25,000 of us ready to die”.
It’s easy to be disappointed. The speed at which it was all over meant Ukraine was not afforded the battlefield advantage for its counter-offensive it would have received in a more drawn-out confrontation. There was also not enough time for Russian political opponents to the war to mobilise, nor for citizens to use a window of opportunity to take to the streets. The potential for this is currently underestimated.
Yet Putin is weak. He was, of course, already weak, but he is now also exposed. There were little more than eight hours between him publicly declaring that the mutineers would be “punished harshly before the law” and letting Prigozhin fly to Belarus without any charges whatsoever. Of course, what happens to Prigozhin subsequently remains to be seen. But it was an admission by Putin that he doubted his own control over the state to crush the mutiny. The President’s bluff in the morning was called by the afternoon.
Putin’s allies noticed. Uganda’s offer to send military assistance (to the “second army of the world”) will not have been received in Moscow with quite the same enthusiasm in which it was sent. And that Lukashenko had brokered the deal, a man patronised by Putin to maintain his own power, also speaks to Putin’s failing grasp on control. Those governments still on the fence, such as India and many Middle Eastern states, will be wondering how much longer they can sustain their positions. At some point, they will need to be seen backing the winning side, India and Saudi Arabia in particular. China, of course, will press home any advantage over Putin’s frailty.
Prigozhin also called out the official Russian justification for the war in Ukraine in a video address, that is, that Russia was threatened by a Ukrainian invasion of neo-Nazis and NATO itself. It is unlikely that Progozhin’s video will be seen by the wider Russian audience. Nonetheless, it does detract from the Russian narrative and may well ruffle feathers amongst the Russian oligarchy who already suffer from Western sanctions.
With Prigozhin in Belarus, it will be interesting to see what becomes of the Wagner PMC and its presence in Ukraine. Scenarios range from the conservative (Putin installs a more loyal head) to the more optimistic (the PMC is disbanded altogether). Perhaps most likely is something in between, such as Wagner units being incorporated into the regular Russian armed forces and its African operations allowed to continue. In any case, Wagner’s effectiveness as a fighting force is disrupted to some degree. This no doubt benefits Ukraine on the battlefield.
That Wagner was not confronted militarily to any meaningful degree in the hours before the Lukashenko deal points to Russian military incompetence, inability or insubordination, or perhaps all three. In Ukraine, the impact of the saga on the regular Russian military will be felt, despite its brevity. First, its ace unit is now compromised operationally and may not rejoin the battlefield. Second, its regular troops in the trenches will have watched an insurgent force capture its headquarters and move over 700km in Russia itself virtually unopposed. Combine that with further scheduled deliveries of Western weapons, including F-16 fighter jets, and it is hard to see Russian morale in anything other than terminal decline.
Yet had Prigozhin continued on his march, Pandora’s box might have been less forgiving. A rapid Ukrainian breakthrough in the midst of civil war in Russia may well have lowered the threshold for Putin’s willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons, or use the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to the same ends. That’s not to mention Wagner capturing nuclear facilities or weapons in Russia itself as a means of blackmail.
A political upheaval in Moscow would most likely have led to a more radical figure in charge of Russia’s Ukrainian operation. Prigozhin himself is counted amongst many others in Moscow who have called for nationwide mobilisation and an all-in approach to the war. The Russian nuclear threshold may well have been found to be much lower than it is today. In the absence of a coherent liberal opposition, the idea of a rapid Russian shift to liberal democracy is optimistic.
And so, while Ukraine gained little of the immediate battlefield advantage many had hoped to see, it has seen Putin’s Russia severely weakened and exposed at home, on the battlefield and abroad. The Russian strategy of enduring sanctions and waiting for Western resolve to fray has been turned on its head: Ukrainian endurance and continued Western unity has cracked the Russian sledgehammer tangibly. The advantages may be longer term than many would have liked, but they are nonetheless there. At the same time, Prigozhin’s fold avoids some of the more serious risks precipitating. The whole affair, while seemingly over in 24 hours, is perhaps the best possible outcome for Ukraine.
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